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JURISDICTION
The trial court had jurisdiction over this mater pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-3-4(1). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j). The Judgment was entered by the
trial court on December 27, 2006. Alan Jenkins Trustee's Notice of Appeal
was filed on January 16, 2007, pursuant to Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err when it denied
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment?
Standard of Review: A motion for summary judgment is appropriate
only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court must view all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but it may not
assume facts for which no evidence is offered. The appellate court reviews
the trial court's ruling for correctness. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Peterson v.
Coco-Cola USA. 2002 Utah 42, 48 P.3d 941; Krantz v. Holt. 819 P. 2d 352,
(Utah 1991).
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err when it denied
Appellant's Motion to Amend his Answer to include additional Statutes of
Limitations as defenses?
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Standard of Review: Once responsive pleadings have been filed, a
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings
is abuse of discretion. Kasco Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P. 2d 86 (Utah
1992).
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in refusing to give
jury instructions requested by Defendant?
Standard of Review: It is the duty of the trial court to cover the theories
of both parties in its instructions. Because jury instructions are statements of
the law, the standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is one of
correctness. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834 (1951); Green v.
Louder, 2001 Utah 62, 29 P. 3d 638.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL: Defendant raised the
foregoing issues in his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 56), his Motion
to Amend Pleadings (R. at 244) and Defendant's proposed jury instructions
(R. at 297-315) and counsel's stated objections to the jury instructions on the
record (R. at 386, pages 536-541).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
A. Statutes:

2

U.C.A. §57-1-3. A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass
by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a
lesser estate was intended.
B. Rules:
Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P. A party may amend his pleadings once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive Pleading is permitted and the action
has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case:
This case concerns the ownership of residential real property located at
1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah. By Warranty Deed dated
November 21, 1986, the real property in question was transferred from D.
Gordon Berg to D. U. Company, a Utah corporation. A few months later,
Sam and Elaine Jenkins moved onto the property. D. U. Co. claimed to be the
owner of the property and the landlord of the Jenkins as tenants under a
rental agreement. In 1997, Sam and Elaine Jenkins were divorced and signed
a Stipulation that was filed in the divorce action, stating that except for a
home in Burley, Idaho, they had acquired no other real property during the
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course of their marriage. The disclaimer language from the Stipulation was
incorporated into and made a part of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and the Decree of Divorce filed in that action. A few weeks after the
divorce action became final, Sam Jenkins was killed in an industrial accident.
During the period of time the property was occupied by the Jenkins
family, D. U. Co., Inc. collected rent from Sam and Elaine, until the death of
Sam Jenkins. Thereafter, the rent was paid by Alan Jenkins, Sam's brother.
While the Jenkins occupied the property, D. U. Co. received several notices
from local health agencies complaining about the condition of the property
and threatening to assess fines against D. U. Co. as the property owner, unless
the health and safety violations were corrected. After Sam Jenkins' death, D.
U. Co. threatened to evict Elaine and her children from the property, as Elaine
refused to maintain the property, refused to sign a new lease agreement and
refused to pay any rent. In order to avoid having the Jenkins family evicted,
Alan Jenkins began paying the rent to D. U. Co.
In January 2005, because of the continuing complaints from the Salt
Lake City and County health departments, D. U. Co. informed Alan Jenkins
that because Elaine would not maintain the property, it would have to evict
her and her family, to avoid the threatened fines. Alan Jenkins purchased the
property from D. U. Co. in an attempt to avoid having Elaine evicted from the
property. After the purchase, Alan Jenkins was unsuccessful in his attempts
to work with Elaine to complete the needed repairs of the property and after
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receiving additional demands from the City and County health departments
that he complete the repairs or face substantial fines, he determined that the
only way to get the repairs completed would be to move Elaine and her
children from the property so that the repairs could be made.
B. Course of Proceedings.
On February 11, 2005, Alan Jenkins served Elaine Jenkins and her adult
children, Loren, Stanley and Jeremiah Jenkins, with a notice that their tenancy
of the property would terminate at the end of the current month.

After

receiving the notice, on February 18, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed a Complaint
against Alan Jenkins Trustee, contending that she and her ex-husband, Sam,
were not tenants, but were the owners of the property (Case #050903391).
On February 25, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed an Amended Complaint. On
March 1, 2008, before being served in case #050903391 and being unaware
of that lawsuit, Alan Jenkins, Trustee, filed a Complaint, alleging unlawful
detainer against Elaine, Loren, Stanley and Jeremiah Jenkins, seeking to
recover possession of the property, so that he could complete the needed
repairs (Case #050904099). On March 8, 2005, Elaine, Loren, Stanley and
Jeremiah moved to consolidate case #050904099 with case #050903391. The
District Court granted the Motion. On March 14, 2005, Alan Jenkins, Trustee
moved the Court for an expedited trial setting on his Complaint in unlawful
detainer. The Court denied the Motion. On June 23, 2005, Elaine Jenkins
moved to file a Second Amended Complaint, adding D. U. Company, Inc. and
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Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. as defendants.

The trial court

granted the Motion. On August 4, 2005, Alan Jenkins moved for Summary
Judgment. The District Court denied the Motion. On October 25, 2005,
Defendant D. U. Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint against
D. U. Company. The District Court granted the Motion, dismissing Elaine
Jenkins' Complaint against D. U. Company.

On June 26, 2006, Defendants

Alan Jenkins, Trustee and Davis County Co-operative moved to amend their
Answer to include additional statute of limitations defenses, particularly
U.C.A. §§78-12-25 and 78-12-26. The District Court denied the Motion.
C. Disposition in Trial Court
The case was tried to a jury on October 11,12 and 13, 2006. The jury
found in favor of Elaine Jenkins, ruling that the property belonged to Elaine
and the estate of her ex-husband, Sam, even though Sam was not and never
had been a party to the action.
D. Statement of Facts
1. On November 21, 1986, D. U. Company, Inc. purchased the property
located at 1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah from Gordon
Berg and received a warranty deed for the property. (R. at 385, p. 212; Ex. D12).
2. Shortly after the purchase of the property, Sam and Elaine Jenkins
moved onto the property. (R. at 385, p. 213).
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3.

D. U. company, Inc. maintained a rent ledger for the subject

property, indicating that rent of $250.00 per month was received for the
property. (Ex. D-36).
4. Sam and Elaine Jenkins were divorced on August 6, 1977. In the
divorce action, the parties, their attorneys, the guardian ad litem for Sam's and
Elaine's minor children and a representative from the Utah Attorney
General's office, all executed a Stipulation, and the attorneys representing the
parties executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of
Divorce, each of which contained the following language: (Ex's D-9, D-43,
D-44).
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain
real property in Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the divorce
decree, defendant shall deliver to plaintiff a properly executed deed
quit-claiming to plaintiff defendant's interest in the real property in
lieu of alimony.
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of
the marriage.
5. Shortly after Sam and Elaine were divorced, Sam Jenkins was killed
in an industrial accident. (R. at 384, p. 72).
6. After the divorce, Alan Jenkins began paying D. U. Co. rent on the
subject property for the benefit of Elaine Jenkins and her children. (R. at 385,
p. 240; R. at 386, p. 405; Ex. D-17 )
7. During the time the property was occupied by the Jenkins family, D.
U. Company received several notices from the Salt Lake Valley Health
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Department, advising of health and safety violations existing on the property
and threatening to fine D. U. Co. as the property owner, unless the violations
were abated. (Ex's D-18, D-25, D-26, D-27, D-28, D-29, D-30, D-32, D-33).
8. On February 6, 2005, Alan Jenkins purchased the subject property
from D. U. Company (Ex. D-13), paying $126,347.75 for the property. (Ex.
D-15).
9. On February 7, 2005, Alan Jenkins transferred the subject property
to the Alan Jenkins Trust. (Ex. D-14).
10. On February 11, 2005, Alan Jenkins served Elaine Jenkins, and her
adult children Loren Jenkins, Stanley Jenkins and Jeremiah Jenkins, with a
Notice to Quit, requiring them to vacate the subject property, so that Alan
could make the repairs required by the Salt Lake Valley Health Department.
(R. at 385, p. 248, 249; Ex. D-19).
11. On February 18, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed a Complaint in these
consolidated actions. (R. at 1-7).
12.

On March 1, 2005, Alan Jenkins filed a Complaint in these

consolidated actions, as Elaine Jenkins and her children refused to vacate the
premises. (R. at 1-9, case #050904099)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The trial court erred in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary
Judgment, as Elaine Jenkins' claims to the subject property were barred by
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statute and the issue of Elaine and Sam Jenkins' lack of ownership of the
subject property had already been determined in a previous court proceeding.
2. The trial court erred in denying the motion of Alan Jenkins and
Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. to amend their answer to Elaine
Jenkins' Second Amended Complaint, to include additional statute of
limitations defenses. The defenses were valid, would not have prejudiced Ms.
Jenkins and the motion should have been granted in the interest of justice.
3. The court erred in failing to give certain requested jury instructions
of Alan Jenkins. By failing to give the requested instructions, the trial court
failed to allow the jury to consider Alan Jenkins' theory of the case.
ARGUMENT
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS5
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Rule 56, U.R.C.P. provides that a party may move for summary
judgment at any time after the expiration of twenty days from the
commencement of the action, and that
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
Defendant Alan Jenkins filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on
August 4, 2005. After briefing and oral argument, the court denied the
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Motion. Based upon the law and the pleadings, Alan Jenkins submits that the
trial court erred.
A. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY
ARE BARRED BY U.C.A. 25-5-1, 25-5-3 and/or 57-1-3.
U.C.A. 25-5-1 provides,
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
U.C.A. 25-5-3 provides,
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale, of any land, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
U.C.A. 57-1-3 provides,
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance
Of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser
estate was intended.
Elaine Jenkins alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of the
subject property. However, she produced no written document subscribed by
Gordon Berg, D. U. Company, Alan Jenkins, or any other person or entity,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring that she had any interest, other
than as a tenant, of the subject property.
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Plaintiff asserted that her claims were not barred by the statute of frauds
because of the "full or partial performance" exception to the statute. However,
before that exception applies, there must be a showing of an agreement or
contract to be performed.

Plaintiff did not allege or show that such an

agreement or contract existed, let alone with whom such an agreement was
made, the terms of any such agreement to be performed, or when her
performance was completed. Her Amended Complaint simply alleged that she
owned the property from the time D. U. Company purchased it in 1988.
In discussing the doctrine of full or partial performance as being an
exception to the statute of frauds, our Supreme Court ruled in Ravarino v.
Price. 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953) at page 574,
The doctrine is to be applied with great care, paying particular
attention to the policy expressed in the statute of frauds and historical
precedent where the limits have been defined by the process of
inclusion and exclusion. In Price v. Lloyd, (citation omitted), this court
said: "Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine invoked by
plaintiff, have not, by any means, intended to annul the statute of
frauds, but only to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a
fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to give evidence of a
contract not in writing, and which is in the very teeth of the statute and
a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish [in equity], by clear and
positive proof, acts and things done in pursuance and on account
thereof, exclusively referable thereto, and which take it out of the
operation of the statute".
The only "clear and positive proof offered by Elaine Jenkins that she
had any interest in the property, was that she was in possession of the property.
Where the evidence was at least conflicting that her possession was as a tenant,
not as an owner, her possession did not evidence acts and things done
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exclusively in pursuance and on account of any agreement that she is or would
become the owner of the property, sufficient to avoid the statute of frauds. Her
possession is simply consistent with the fact that she occupied the property as a
tenant, not as owner.
The Court in the Ravarino case cited above, quoted with approval, the
following language discussing the statute of frauds, from the case of Burns v.
McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273, 274 (1922),
The peril of perjury and error is latent in the spoken promise. Such, at
least, is the warning of the statute, the estimate of policy that finds
expression in its mandate. Equity, in assuming what is in substance a
dispensing power, does not treat the statute as irrelevant, nor ignore the
warning altogether. It declines to act on words, though the legal
remedy is imperfect, unless the words are confirmed and illuminated by
deeds. A power of dispensation, departing from the letter in supposed
adherence to the spirit, involves an assumption of jurisdiction easily
abused, and justified only within the limits imposed by history and
precedent. The power is not exercised unless the policy of the law is
saved.
B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL ESTOPPAL
As stated in the case of Condas v Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980),
"[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by uttering
statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior judicial
proceeding".
Elaine Jenkins alleged in her Complaint that she and her then husband,
Sam Jenkins, acquired their interest in the subject property in 1988. In 1996,
Elaine Jenkins filed for divorce from Sam Jenkins. Sam and Elaine Jenkins
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were both represented by attorneys in the divorce action and they entered into a
stipulated property settlement of all property they owned and in which they had
any interest. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Stipulation, executed by Elaine
Jenkins, her then husband, their attorneys, the guardian ad litem appointed to
represent the children of the marriage and an assistant attorney general, state as
follows:
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real
property in Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of
Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a properly executed deed
quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu
of alimony.
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the
marriage.
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties, the Court entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and parroted the above-quoted language of
the Stipulation in the Decree of Divorce in the action, which provided in
paragraphs 11 and 12,
11. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real
property in Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of
Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a properly executed deed
quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu
of alimony.
12. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the
marriage.
Judicial Estoppel, or collateral estoppel, is the issue preclusion branch,
as differentiated from claim preclusion, of res judicata. As stated in White
Pine Ranches v. Qgusthorpe. 731 P2d 1076 (Utah 1986),
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While it is true that the party asserting the collateral estoppel need not
have been a party to the first action, the party against whom the
estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party.
Plaintiff was clearly a party to the first action for divorce, and is bound
by her statements and the position she took in that action, i.e., that she and Sam
Jenkins had acquired no ownership interest in any real property, other than in
Rupert, Idaho. She did not claim that she acquired any interest in the property
subsequent to her divorce.
The case of Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Newevs, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214,
410 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2000 UT 93, discussed each of the relevant issues in
the case at hand. In Macris the court said on page 1222 of the opinion,
We apply a four-part test to determine whether the doctrine of issue
preclusion is applicable: First, the issue challenged must be identical in
the previous action and in the case at hand. Second, the issue must
have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous
action. Third, the issue must have been competently, fully and fairly
litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the party against whom
collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been
either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. (Citations
omitted.)
In Macris, the issue was whether additional damages that arose after the
first trial, could be awarded in a subsequent trial against a successor-in-interest
of the defendant sued in the first action. The Court on page 1223, said,
Macris argues that because the trial court limited its award of damages
to August 31, 1992, the issue of Macris's entitlement to damages
accruing after August 31, 1992, was never actually litigated or decided
in Macris I. Clearly, if an issue is actually raised by proper pleadings
and treated as an issue in a case, it is conclusively determined by the
first judgment. See Int'l Res., 599 P.2d at 517. However, the
preclusive effects of the doctrine of collateral estoppel go further. The
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general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is applicable to
all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. This application of the general rule extends to questions
necessarily involved in an issue... although no specific finding may
have been made in reference to that matter, and although such matters
were not directly referred to in the pleadings. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments
Sec. 545. It follows, therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or
design withhold issues and litigate them in separate actions. If the
second action involves an issue as to which the judgment in a prior
action is a conclusive adjudication, the estoppel, so far as that issue is
concerned, extends to every matter which was or might have been
urged to sustain or defeat the determination actually made. See Id.
In the Jenkins5 divorce action, there were clear findings, specifically
regarding the issue of property ownership, or the lack thereof. Elaine Jenkins
testified that she signed the stipulation on the advice of her attorney, who
represented to her that it wasn't necessary to address ownership of the property
in the divorce action (R. at 384, p. 122). Even if her testimony were true, as
Macris makes clear, "a party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues
and litigate them in separate actions".
Macris also ruled that issues decided by stipulation of the parties, as was
done in the Jenkins' divorce action, satisfy the "fully and fairly litigated"
requirement of collateral estoppel. The Court ruled on pages 1223-1224 of the
decision,
Macris further argues that because the issue of contract damages was
decided by stipulation, it was not actually litigated and decided for
collateral estoppel purposes.An issue determined by stipulation rather
than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if the parties
manifested an intention to that effect. See, e.g., 18 Charles A. Wright,
Arthur R. Miller &Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
Sec. 4443, at 382 (1981) ("Issue preclusion does not attach unless it is
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clearly shown that the parties intended that the issue be foreclosed in
other litigation."); 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
Sec. 132.03[2][h][ii] (Mathew Bender, 3d ed. 2000) ("[Stipulation
may be binding in a subsequent action ... if the parties ... manifested
an intention to that effect."). In this case, Macris does not argue that
the stipulation concerning contract damages was not binding in general;
rather, Macris argues that the stipulation was not binding as to damages
accruing after August 31, 1992, the date on which Images transferred
its assets to Neways. However, if the stipulation is meant to be final as
to some damages but not final as to other damages, it must say so. Our
review of the record in this case, however, evidences no such intention.
Moreover, the trial court made no finding that its damages award —
which was based on the parties stipulation — was not final as to all
damages. Therefore, we find that the stipulation in this case has res
judicata effect.
Regarding the fourth element of the test outlined above, the Court ruled,
Unlike the doctrine of claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not
require that both cases involve the same parties or their privies. Rather,
issue preclusion applies even if only the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication. (Citations omitted).
The facts of our case fit squarely within and meet each of the four
requirements for collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel to apply. First, the
issue of the ownership, or lack thereof, of the subject real property is identical
in this action and in the previous divorce action.

Second, the Decree of

Divorce ruled as a final judgment, that neither Sam Jenkins nor Elaine Jenkins
had acquired an interest in any real property during the course of their
marriage, other than the real property in Rupert, Idaho. Third, the issue was
competently, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action, by way of
stipulation of the parties, approved by their attorneys and adopted by the
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Judge. Fourth, Elaine Jenkins, Plaintiff in the previous divorce action, is the
person against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in this current action.
Accordingly, there was no issue as to any material fact and Appellant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Complaint should have
been dismissed and Appellant should have been awarded judgment consistent
with his prayer for relief, on his Complaint in case #050904099, which was
consolidated with case #050903391.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS'
MOTION TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE DEFENSE
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Rule 15, U.R.C.P. provides
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it
at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
Alan Jenkins' Answer to the Complaint in case # 050903391, initially
raised as an affirmative defense, statutes of limitation, U.C.A. 78-12-7 and 7812.12. (R. at 13-16). On June 23, 2006, Defendants moved to amend their
Answer to include the additional affirmative defense of the statutes of
limitations, U.C.A. 78-12-25 and 78-12-26.

(R. at 244-245). This was over

three months before the date the trial of the case was scheduled to begin.
U.C.A. 78-12-25, provides:
An action may be brought within four years:
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(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing;
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
U.C.A. 78-12-26, provides:
An action may be brought within three years:
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake
The trial court heard argument on the motion on August 14, 2006 and
denied the motion. (R. at 282). Although the Minute Entry directed Elaine
Jenkins' attorney to prepare the Order, no Order was filed and the reason for
the denial is not apparent from the record.
In considering a motion to amend pleadings, the primary considerations
are whether the parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether
any party would receive an unfair advantage because of the amendment.
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, (Utah Ct. App.) cert,
denied 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990). As Rule 15, U.R.C.P. states, "leave [to
amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires." It should be the goal of
the court to see
[Tjhat the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they
are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules
provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all
issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the
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other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so
requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P. so states. It further allows for an
amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even after judgment,
and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, "failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." This idea is
confirmed by Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P.: "[E]very final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings." A. H. Cheney v. W. R. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205 at 211,
381 P.2d 86, at 91 (1963).
The trial court in our case recognized these basic rules when it granted
Elaine Jenkins leave to amend her Complaint a second time to add additional
parties, even though the deadline for adding new parties had passed and the
discovery deadline had passed, when it ruled,
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to
amend should be liberally granted. This, combined with the relatively
young age of the case and the fact that it is likely no additional
discovery will be required as a result, leads the Court to conclude
amendment should be permitted. Further, amendment promotes the
preference in our system of justice of rendering decisions on the merits.
(R. at 116).
In the case at hand, the proposed amendment would have required no
additional discovery by Elaine Jenkins. Since the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, the burden was on Alan Jenkins to prove the elements of
the defense. Two statutes of limitations were pled as affirmative defenses in
Mr. Jenkins' initial answer, so the time line of events was clearly at issue from
the beginning of the case. The proposed amendment would have simply added
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two additional statutes that became material once Alan Jenkins completed his
discovery and interviewed witnesses in preparation for trial.
One of the critical issues regarding the statutes of limitations proposed to
be added as affirmative defenses was, when did Elaine Jenkins know or should
have known that she had a cause of action against the defendants named in her
action. Elaine Jenkins filed her Complaint on February 18, 2005, alleging that
she owned the property at issue and that the named Defendants held the
property for her under a theory of constructive trust. After discovery had been
completed and witnesses interviewed in preparation for the trial, Alan Jenkins
discovered that Elaine certainly knew that she had a cause of action several
years before she filed her Complaint, because she had asked that title to the
property be transferred to her in 1997, eight years before she filed the
Complaint. Elaine Jenkins confirmed these events in her testimony at trial:
Q. BY MR. CLINE: Do you recall seeing any of those letters?
A. Yes I do.
Q. And did you receive those letters in the mail?
A. Yes
Q. What did you do when you received those in the mail?
A. I didn't do anything.
Q. Did you call Ms. Crossley?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you talk to her?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Was it after this that you went and talked to Paul Kingston?
A. It was after my husband's death, right after his death.
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Q. So these were the summer of-A. Yes.
Q. What are the dates on there?
A. May 15th, 1997 on this one. So yes, it was after the - - yes.
Q. So it would have been shortly after you received these letters you
went and talked to Paul Kingston?
A. Yes.
Q. This is where you had the conversation that you've previously
testified about, where he acknowledged that you owned the property
and you tried to negotiate getting the deed?
A. Yes.
(R. at 384, pp. 441-442)
If adding two new defendants to the case, as the court ruled in permitting
Elaine to file a second amended complaint, would not likely require additional
discovery, then adding two additional statutes of limitation as defenses, where
the statute of limitations had already been pled as defenses in Alan Jenkins'
initial Answer, would certainly not likely require additional discovery. The
proposed amendment particularly would not require any additional discovery
by Elaine Jenkins, where these are affirmative defenses and the named
defendants would have had the burden of proving them. More than ninety
days between the time the motion was filed and the date set for trial, was
certainly adequate time to put Elaine Jenkins on notice of the defenses, and
allowing the amendment would not have resulted in any prejudice. On the
other hand, denying Alan Jenkins and Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc.
the right to present those defenses, where they were certainly viable and likely
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would have resulted in a far different outcome, denied them the justice that the
court is obligated to provide to all parties.
In the case of Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development.
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, (Utah 1998), our Supreme Court ruled that it was an abuse
of discretion, requiring remand, for a trial court to refuse to grant the leave to
amend without any justifying reason appearing in the record for the denial.
The Supreme Court in Aurora said,
In deciding a motion to amend, the trial court should primarily consider
whether granting the motion would subject the opposing party to
unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had
not time to prepare.
Although it appears that at the very least, remand of this case is required
to allow the trial court to assess the factors that must be reviewed to determine
whether or not the motion should have been granted, and then make a record of
that assessment for the appellate court to review, in this case Alan Jenkins
submits that the record is clear that the denial was an abuse of discretion.
There can be no showing of prejudice to Elaine Jenkins and the motion should
have been granted.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY ALAN JENKINS
Alan Jenkins requested 8 separate, material jury instructions that were
not given by the trial court. (R. at 297-305). The requested instructions went
to the heart of Alan Jenkins' theory of the case. Alan Jenkins theory was that
the property had been purchased and was owned by D. U. Co., Inc. Sam and
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Elaine Jenkins were tenants of the property. After Sam (Alan's brother) and
Elaine were divorced, Alan paid the rent on the property to avoid having Sam's
children evicted from the premises. D. U. Co. intended to evict Elaine and the
children from the property for failure to maintain the property, even though
Alan Jenkins had been paying the rent. Sam and Elaine denied having any
ownership in the property, when their assets were distributed in their divorce
action. Alan Jenkins purchased the property from D. U. Co. in an attempt to
assist Sam's children. After the purchase, Alan learned that it would be
impossible to work with Elaine to make the improvements to the premises
mandated by the local health agencies, unless Elaine Jenkins and her children
were removed from the property. Alan, as owner of the property, attempted to
have Elaine and her children removed, in order to make the needed repairs.
Each of the requested instructions is supported by statute or case law, as
cited after the requested instruction and evidence was presented that clearly put
the theories covered by the requested instructions at issue.
The proposed instructions at R. 298, 299, 300 and 304 addressed Alan
Jenkins' theory that Elaine Jenkins had no interest in the property and had no
evidence that there was any agreement that she would be given any interest,
other than as tenant. This theory was supported by documents presented as
evidence, that showed record title to the property going from Gordon Berg to
D.U. Co., Inc., to Alan Jenkins, to Alan Jenkins, Trustee. (Exs. D-12, D-14, D16).

The testimony of Verl Johnson, Alan Jenkins, Luann Calfa, Joseph
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Kingston, Alanna Kingston, Elaine Crossley and Francis Mark Hansen also
supported this theory. Verl Johnson, Vice President of D. U. Co., testified that
to his knowledge, D. U. Co., did not hold title to any property that was not
owned by D. U. Company (R. at 385, p. 212); that Elaine Jenkins was a tenant
of the property (R. at 385, p. 213); and that D. U. Co. Inc. owned the subject
property, received the property tax notices and paid the taxes on the property
until it was sold to Alan Jenkins (R. at 385, pp. 213-214).
Alan Jenkins testified that he purchased the subject property from D. U.
Co. for the price of $126, 347.75 (R. at 385, pp. 227-227); that he was present
when the agreement was reached that Sam and Elaine Jenkins would rent the
property for $250.00 per month plus Sam would help D. U. Co. on its rental
properties (R. at 385, pp. 232-233); that he (Alan) paid the rent on the property
for Sam and Elaine (R. at 385, pp. 237-238, 240, Ex. D-17); that he went over
the Stipulation in the divorce action with Sam Jenkins and his attorney when
Sam and Elaine acknowledged that they owned no real property, except the
home in Idaho (R. at 385, p. 239).
Luann Calfa, employed by Salt Lake City Housing and Zoning
Enforcement, testified that Elaine Jenkins told her that she was not the owner
of the property (R. at 385, p. 314).
Joseph Kingston, property manager for D. U. Co., testified that Sam and
Elaine Jenkins were renting the property (R. at 385, p. 323).
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Alanna Kingston, secretary of Davis County Co-operative Society,
testified that Sam and Elaine Jenkins told her that they were renting the subject
property (R. at 385, p. 350).
Elaine Crossley, who was formerly employed by D. U. Co., testified that
Elaine Jenkins was a tenant of the subject property (R. at 386, p. 397); that
Sam and Elaine Jenkins paid rent on the property (R. at 386, p. 398); that
Elaine filled out a form for housing assistance (Ex. D-8), that acknowledged
that she was renting the property for $250.00 per month (R. at 386, pp 406407).
Francis Mark Hansen testified that he represented Sam Jenkins in the
divorce action against Elaine Jenkins (R. at 386, p. 421); that he required Sam
to disclose all of his assets and liabilities (R. at 386, p. 423); that he discussed
with Sam the Stipulation, specifically with respect to any real property the
parties owned, and that it was very clear that the parties did not own the
subject property, but were only renting (R. at 386, p. 425).
The proposed instructions at R.301 and 302 addressed Alan Jenkins
theory that Elaine Jenkins' claims to the property were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.
The proposed instructions at R. 303 and 305, addressed Alan Jenkins
theory that Elaine Jenkins' claims were barred by estoppal and judicial
estoppal. Again, the evidence that Sam and Elaine Jenkins denied that they
owned the property, stipulated in their divorce action that they did not own the
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property, allowed Alan Jenkins to pay rent on their behalf for the property,
which ultimately led Alan Jenkins to purchase the property from D. U. Co., the
record title holder, supported Alan Jenkins' theory.
Although there was contradictory testimony regarding ownership of the
property, Alan Jenkins was entitled to present his theories of the case to the
jury, through instructions that set forth the governing law. By refusing to
instruct the jury on Alan Jenkins' theories, the trial court committed error.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion for
Summary Judgment, the trial court's decision should be reversed and judgment
awarded to Alan Jenkins in accordance with the prayer in his Complaint in
case #050904099. Further, even if it were not error to deny Alan Jenkins'
motion for summary judgment, because the trial court erred in denying the
motion of Alan Jenkins and Davis County Co-operative Society for leave to
amend their Answer to assert additional Stature of Limitations defenses,
without stating for the record the reasons for the denial, the case should be
remanded either to direct the court to allow the amendment and for a new
trial, or for the trial court to review its denial and either permit the amendment
and grant a new trial, or state on the record the reasons for the denial. Further,
because the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury instructions requested
by Alan Jenkins and Davis County Co-operative Society, the case should be
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remanded to the trial court for a new trial, with the requested jury instructions
properly given to the jurors.
Dated this .-/

day of April, 2008.

^-V-

<^*g^

Carl E. Kingston
^
Attorney for Appellant Alan Jenkins
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LE0 DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC2F2006
SALT LAKE ftdUNTY

Russell A. Cline (4298)
Crippen & Cline L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
File No. 205009.01

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
>GMENTS /
OF JUDC
DATE
L^ ;

IMAGED

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE JENKINS
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
CIVIL NO. 050903391
JUDGE: Fratto

vs.
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U.
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC.,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court for jury trial on October 11,12, and 13,2006, and
plaintiff being represented by Russell A. Cline and defendants Alan Jenkins, Trustee, and Davis
County Cooperative Society, Inc. being represented by Carl Kingston, and D.U. Company, Inc.
having previously been dismissedfromthis action on a motion by D.U. Company, Inc., and the jury
having made its findings in this matter pursuant to a Special Verdict, and good cause appearing, it
is hereby ordered, decreed and adjudged as follows:

Judgment @J

050903391

JD20920160
JENKINS.ALAN

1.

All of plaintiff s claims in the consolidated action of Alan Jenkins, Trustee vs. Elaine

Jenkins, Loren Jenkins, Stanley Jenkins and Jeremiah Jenkins, Civil No. 050904099, including all
claims for payment of rent, are hereby dismissed on the merits and with prejudice.
2.

The property at 1074 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, as more fully described

below, is hereby quieted in the name of Samuel Jenkins and Elaine Jenkins, free and clear of any
liens or claims affecting title to the foregoing property by Alan Jenkins, individually and/or as
Trustee of the A. Jenkins Trust, Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc. or D.U. Company, Inc.
3.

The property referenced in paragraph 2 is the following property located in Salt Lake

County, Utah:
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20f West 2099 ft and 75 ft East
from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W,
SLB&M; thence South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence
North 0°20' East 60 ft; thence West 130 ft to the pont of beginning,
cont. 0.18 acres.
ALSO
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2039,ft and 75 ft East
from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Sec 27, T IN, R1W,
SLB&M; thence South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence
North 0°20T Easi 60 ft; thence West 130 ft lo the point of beginning,
cont. 0.18 acres.
Parcel No. 08-27-251-011
4.

Plaintiff is awarded costs against defendants Alan Jenkins and Davis County

Cooperative Society, Inc. in the amount of $875.04.
5.

This Judgment is not intended to preclude defendants from hereafter asserting any

claim which was not required to be raised in this action, whether as a defense to plaintiffs quiet title

action, pursuant to Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise, that may result in a
lien against the Property.
DATED this JI

day of December, 2006

Approved as to form:

J£L
Carl Kingston

t>l0

ADDENDUM 2

Rule 15

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
ELAINE JENKINS,
:
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:
Civil No. 050903391

ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE,
Defendants.

:
:

Judge Fratto

—oooOooo—
Comes now the Plaintiff and moves the Court for Summary Judgment in favor of
Defendant, against Plaintiff, dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and awarding judgment to
Defendant in accordance with the prayer of his Complaint in case #050904099,
consolidated with this action. This Motion is based upon the pleadings in this case and
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith, which show
that there is no dispute as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Dated this

Y

day of August, 2005.
^

S<

Carl E. Kingston
Attorney for Defendant

£=>

4

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary
Judgment to Russell A. Cline, Esq., 10 West 100 South, Suite 425, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this

f

day of August, 2005, postage prepaid.

Carl E. Kingston

ADDENDUM 4

*nird Judicial District
SALT LAKE C o W <

Russell A. Cline (4298)
Crippen & Cline L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 539-1900
Telefax (801) 322-1054
File No. 205009.01

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE JENKINS
Plaintiff,

ORDER
CIVIL NO. 050903391
JUDGE: Fratto

vs.
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U.
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC.,
Defendants.

Defendant Alan Jenkins, Trustee's, Motion for Summary Judgment having come before the
Court on Monday, November 7,2005, and plaintiff being represented by Russell A. Cline, defendant
being represented by Carl Kingston, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered, decreed and
adjudged as follows:
1.

Defendant Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

14-,!

.£

DATED this / *7

Approved as to Form:

Carl Kingston

day of November, 2005

ADDENDUM 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FILED OiSTIlCT COURT
Third Judicial District

ELAINE JENKINS,

A

MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiff,
Hon.

ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE,

J

2005

Jj

SALT LA^E COUNTY

Case No.
vs.

^ '

05090^39I___V

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, J^J

August 16, 2005

Defendant,

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint,
submitted for decision on July 27, 2005.

A hearing has not

requested, nor is one required by the Rules.

Accordingly, the

ruling with respect tc this matter will be addressed in the
following Minute Entry.
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
leave to amend should be liberally granted.

This, combined with

the relatively young age of the case and the fact that it is
likely no additional discovery will be required as a result,
leads the Court to conclude amendment should be permitted.
Further, amendment promotes the preference in our system of
justice of rendering decisions on the merits.
Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint is granted.

\\U

Deputy Clerk

DATED t h i s

&

d a y of A u g u s t ,

2005

\n
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CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826)
Attorney for Defendants
3212 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone: 486-1458

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
ELAINE JENKINS,
:
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MOTION TO AMEND
ANSWERS OF DEFENDANTS

:
Civil No. 050903391
:

ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, et al.,
Defendants.

:

Judge Fratto

—oooOooo—
Come now the Defendants and move the Court for an Order permitting
them to amend their Answers filed in this case, to include the affirmative defenses
of the statutes of limitations, particularly, U.C.A. 78-12-25 and 78=12=26. Copies
of the proposed Amended Answers are submitted herewith.
Dated this
day of June, 2006.

Carl E. Kingston
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to
Russell A. Cline, Esq., facsimile #322-1054, 10 West 100 South, Suite 425, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, t h i s ^ > ^ day of June, 2006, postage prepaid.

Carl E. Kingston

't^

ADDENDUM 7

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWERS

vs.

Case No: 050903391 PR

ALAN JENKINS

Clerk:

Et al,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

JOSEPH C. FRATTO
August 14, 2 006

wendyd

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RUSSELL A CLINE
Defendant's Attorney(s): CARL E KINGSTON
Video
Tape Count: 10-40:55

HEARING
COUNT: 10:40:55
On record
Matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to amend answer.
Counsel state their arguments.
The Court states findings and denies the motion.
Mr. Cline to prepare the order.

Page 1 (last)
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

Space Above for Recorder's Use
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Harrantg Deed
, grantor,

D. GORDON BERG
, County of

tfSalt Lake City

Salt Lake

, State of Utah,

hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to
D. U. COMPANY, INC.
53 West Angelo Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

, grantee,

of Salt Lake City
, County of Salt Lake
for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable consideration
the following described tract of land in

Salt Lake

, State of Utah,
DOLLARS,

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20T West 2099 ft and 75 ft East from
the Northwest Corner of the Northeast i of Sec 27, T IN, R IW, SLB&M ;
thence South 0°20T West 60 ft; thence E&&t 130 ft}', thence North 0°20 f
^3 / East 60 ft; thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres.

>ts

I
I
!
f
|

ALSO
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20 f West 2039 ft and 75 ft East from the
Northwest Corner of the Northeast i of Sec 27, T IN, R IW, SLB&M; thence
South 0°20T West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20T East 60 ft;
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres.

WITNESS the hand of said grantor ,this 21st
Signed in the presence of

day of

,19 86

November

Q J&^, ~^f

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT L/[]KE
On the 21st day of November

9 86 , personally appeared before me
, the signer of the above instrument,

* r/-v^ B e r g
who duly. aekriowi^foedito me that he executed the same.
/

7 x\0 ( A/%

\

My Commission. Expires:
• ' July i;>*88
FORM 101.1 ^MmmANTY

DEED — Krflv C.n «K W KWK C~..»U aw ~

j»i<^Z,
NotarylPublic^
Residing at:

Salt Lake City, Utah
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When recorded, mail to:
Alan Jenkins
3212 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
ALAN JEHKINS

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

3212 S STATE
SLC UT 84115
Z$V\
D.U. COMPANY, INC. a corporation organized and existing ijft&er-tlfe lfiWffthe<8tabPof Utah, with its principle office in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, Grantor,

\p.

hereby conveys and warrants against all claiming by, through or under it to ALAN JENKINS,
3212 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, Grantee,
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following
described tract of land in Salt Lake County, Utah:
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2099 ft and 75 ft East from the
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20' East 60 ft;
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres.
ALSO
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0° 20' West 2039 ft and 75 ft East from the
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20'East 60 ft;
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres.

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.

0

o

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be
hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers this Lfl1 day of F&brutOLru
, 20#5

°t-

\

o

JO

D.U. COMPANY, I

Attest:
(Corporate Seal)

Secretary

Bv: /2a

hA^oCt^ey^^

A.O. Gardner,

Secretary

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
_, 20 Dai, personally appeared before me
&
, who being byme duly sworn, did say, each for himself, that s/he
is the president of D.U. COMPANY, INC., and that the within and foregoing instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by the authority of a resolution of its board of directors, and
said
A.O- GjQJrdjflUT
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed
thes;
eal of the said corporation.
NOTARY FUBUtfT
On the

gr*

day of

ELAINE CKOkSLfcV
3212 S. STATE ST.
SALT LAKE CITY, UT MW*

MY COMMISSION £Kftftf&
SEPTEMBER 2** *&&
STATS OF UTAK

Notary Public 0
DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT * H

V£*ft<6cl7)<te#>(

ADDENDUM 10

When recorded, mail to:
Alan Jenkins
3212 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

•y^ 9*500*3
02/08/2005 03s 22 PM * i i . O O
Book - 9092 F'3 - 5/H9
GARY U . O T T

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

RECORDER, :3ALT LAKE COUNTY? iiT'4M
ALAN JENKINS
3212 S STATE
SIX UT 84115
BY: ZJM, DEPUTY - UI 1 P.

ALAN JENKINS, Grantor, of Salt Lake City, Utah, Salt Lake County hereby conveys
and warrants against all claiming by, through or under it, but not otherwise to A. JENKINS
TRUST, 3212 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, Grantee, A/a* Jenkins
TrusZ&s
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following
described tract of land in Salt Lake County, Utah:
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2099 ft and 75 ft East from the
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20' East 60 ft;
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres.

00

ALSO
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0° 20' West 2039 ft and 75 ft East from the
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20'East 60 ft;
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres.

WITNESS the hand of said grantor this V day of f i

,20Q

L

f^

5*>
STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

f

day of

Y^^^W^y^
20<^J, personally appeared before me
, the signer of the above instrument, who being by me duly sworn,
did say, that he executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
CARL 6. KINGSTON
3212 South State Street
Spit Lake City, UT 84115
My Commission Expires

06/22/2008
- -STATE OF UTAH

«^&*"-r 6

^r?

Notary Public

ADDENDUM 11

F. Mark Hansen, #5078
624 North 300 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 533-2700
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR
ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 964905253
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner T. P. Casey

)

STIPULATION
The parties stipulate and agree as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have

resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of

the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.
3.

There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine

Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie
Jenkins, born June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins,
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991.
4.

Utah is the home state of the children. There are no proceedings affecting the minor

children, or any of them, filed or pending in Juvenile Court.
"
lip

DEFENDANT'S*
EXHIBIT

lit 9

5.

Plaintiff shall be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor children.

6.

Defendant shall be awarded temporary visitation with the children for a period of six

months as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)
(g)

(h)

Wednesdays, to begin no earlier than 4:00 p.m. and end no later than 8:00 p.m.
Alternating weekends — Saturdays beginning June 7, 1997 for a five hour block of time to
be agreed on by the parties, and Sundays from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
Labor Day from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and Thanksgiving from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
Birthdays on the following days during weekend visitation hours: Charles' birthday — May
24, 1997; Rebecca's birthday — July 12, 1997; Lorin's birthday — November 16, 1997.
Father's Day from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
Two uninterrupted four-day overnight visits during the summer, one of which shall be from
July 3, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. to July 6, 1997 at 9:00 p.m., and the other in August, to be agreed
on by the parties and the children. Overnight visits shall be conditioned on Defendant
having suitable sleeping accomodations for the children, which may include the use of tents
and sleeping bags.
Telephone contact at reasonable hours. Phone calls by Defendant shall be initiated no later
than 8:00 p.m.
Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation:
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children
at all such events and activities.
Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children.

During the temporary visitation period, two or more of the parties' children born before 1985 shall
be present during visitation with the parties' children born after 1985. There shall be a review at
the conclusion of the temporary visitation period. If the review raises no significant concerns,
visitation thereafter shall be according to the following schedule:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

One weekday evening to be specified by Defendant from 5:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.
Alternating weekends from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday.
In years ending in an odd number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)
Children's birthdays on the day before or after the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m.; at Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday,
(ii)
Human Rights Day and Veterans's Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday
to 7:00 p.m. on the holiday.
(iii)
Easter holiday and Memorial Day, from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.,
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled,
(iv)
July 24th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday,
(v)
The time period beginning the evening the children get out of school for the
Christmas school break plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m.
In years ending in an even number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)
Children's birthdays on the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; at
Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday,
(ii)
New Year's Day, President's Day and Columbus Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day before
the holiday until 7:00 p.m on the holiday.
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(e)

(f)
(g)

(h)
(i)

(j)

(iii)
July 4th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday.
(iv)
Labor Day from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday
extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled.
(v)
The fall school break commonly known as U.E.A. weekend, and Thanksgiving
holiday, from 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends
for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled.
(vi)
From Christmas Day at 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. the last day of the Christmas school
break.
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the
regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation, schedule. If a holiday falls on a
regularly scheduled school day, Defendant shall be responsible for the child's attendance at
school for that school day. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and
Defendant is free from work, Defendant shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period.
Father's Day shall be spent with Defendant every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.
Mother's Day shall be spent with Plaintiff every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.
Defendant may have extended visitation during the children's summer vacation from school
for up to four weeks at Defendant's option. Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for
Defendant. The remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for Plaintiff consistent
with the above visitatiori schedule. Plaintiff shall have an identical two week period of
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of
vacation. If the children are enrolled in year-round school, Defendant's extended visitation
shall be xh of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided Plaintiff has holiday
and phone visits. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks shall be provided at
least 21 days in advance to the other parent.
Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours.
Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation:
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children
at all such events and activities.
Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children.
7.

On October 30, 1996 a Protective Order was issued in the case of Elaine Jenkins v.

Samuel Jenkins. Civil No. 960907171SA (Utah 3d. Dist. Ct, Judge Thome). The Protective Order
shall be consolidated in the Decree of Divorce. Defendant's compliance with the Protective Order
shall be reviewed at the same time as the review of temporary visitation. If there have been no
violations of the Protective Order, Plaintiff and Defendant shall jointly move the court entering the
Protective Order to set it aside. The following shall be entered as a protective order in this action:
Neither party shall commit or threaten to commit any act of physical violence, injury,
intimidation or harassment against the other party, or against any of the children, or
against the other party's real or personal property. Neither party shall enter the real
property of the other party, except for the purpose of implementing the child custody
and visitation provisions of this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce, or by prior
invitation by the other party.

- 3 -

8.
(a)
(b)

(c)

Child support shall be awarded as follows:

Child support shall be awarded pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, using
actual or imputed incomes of $867.00 per month for Plaintiff and $787.00 per month for
Defendant, for a base child support award in the amount of $333.55 per month.
The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during
which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement
of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for reduction of
child support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative agency.
Normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an
interruption of the consecutive day requirement.
Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding pursuant to U.C. A. 62A-11 Parts
4 and 5.
9.

The provisions of U.C.A. sections 78-45-7.15 and -7.16 shall be incorporated and

made a part of the divorce decrbe.
10.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in Rupert,

Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a
properly executed deed quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu of
alimony.
11.

The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage.

12.

Defendant shall be awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools,

one set of the parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers.
Plaintiff shall be awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer.' Defendant shall be awarded all
other vehicles. Plaintiff shall be awarded all other personal property.
13.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible for their own student loans,

and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from liability therefore.
14.

Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff harmless from liability on all other

debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred by the parties prior to their separation.
Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole responsibility of the party who incurred the
particular debt or obligation.
15.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax returns for 1995 and 1996.
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16.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for the parties' minor

children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is current in his child support
obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the personal exemptions for the
minor children on his income tax return.
17.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs.

18.

Each party shall execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required to

implement this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce.
19.

This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, and

resolves all issues presently outstanding between Plaintiff and Defendant raised by the pleadings in
this matter.

MOTION
Elaine Jenkins, Samuel Jenkins, the Guardian ad Litem and Utah Department of Human
Services agree to the above Stipulation, and jointly move the Court to enter a Decree of Divorce
incorporating the terms of the Stipulation.
DATED this j j ^ day of May, 1997.

2162p008
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ADDENDUM 12

flltflOlSrittCTCOIttT
Third. Indicia! District

F. Mark Hansen, #5078
624 North 300 West, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 533-2700
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE JENKINS,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,

vs.
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 964905253
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Commissioner T. P. Casey

The parties having stipulated to the terms of a Decree of Divorce and having moved the
Court to enter a Decree of Divorce incorporating the terms of the stipulation, the Court having
reviewed the terms of the stipulation and finding those terms reasonable, and being fully informed,
hereby enters the following Decree of Divorce. The Court orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have

resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of

the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.
3.

There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine

Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie
Jenkins, born June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins,
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991.

4.

Utah is the home state of the children. There are no proceedings affecting the minor

children, or any of them, filed or pending in Juvenile Court.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor children.

6.

Defendant is awarded temporary visitation with the children for a period of six

months as follows:
(a)

Wednesdays, to begin no earlier than 4:00 p.m. and end no later than 8:00 p.m.

(b)

Alternating weekends — Saturdays beginning June 7, 1997 for a five hour block of time to
be agreed on by the parties, and Sundays from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

(c)

Labor Day from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and Thanksgiving from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
Birthdays on the following Saturdays during weekend visitation hours: Charles' birthday —
May 24, 1997; Rebecca's birthday — July 12, 1997; birthday — November 16, 1997.

(d)

Father's Day from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

(e)

Two uninterrupted four-day overnight visits during the summer, one of which shall be from
July 3, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. to July 6, 1997 at 9:00 p.m., and the other in August, to be agreed
on by the parties and the children.

(f)

Telephone contact at reasonable hours. Phone calls by Defendant shall be initiated no later
than 8:00 p.m.

(g)

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation:
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children
at all such events and activities.

(h)

Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children.

During the temporary visitation period, two or more of the parties' children born before 1985 shall
be present during visitation with the parties' children born after 1985. There shall be a review at
the conclusion of the temporary visitation period. If the review raises no significant concerns,
visitation thereafter shall be as follows:
(a)

One weekday evening to be specified by Defendant from 5:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

(b)

Alternating weekends from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday.

(c)

In years ending in an odd number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)
Children's birthdays on the day before or after the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m.; at Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday,
(ii)
Human Rights Day and Veterans's Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday
to 7:00 p.m. on the holiday.
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(iii)
Easter holiday and Memorial Day, from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m.,
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled,
(iv)
July 24th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday,
(v)
The time period beginning the evening the children get out of school for the
Christmas school break plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m.
(d)

In years ending in an even number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)
Children's birthdays on the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; at
Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday.
(ii)
New Year's Day, President's Day and Columbus Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday.
(iii)
July 4th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday.
(iv)
Labor Day from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday
extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled.
(v)
The fall school break commonly known as U.E.A. weekend, and Thanksgiving
holiday, from 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends
for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled.
(vi)
From Christmas t)ay at 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. the last day of the Christmas school
break.

(e)

Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the
regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule. If a holiday falls on a
regularly scheduled school day, Defendant shall be responsible for the child's attendance at
school for that school day. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and
Defendant is free from work, Defendant shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period.

(0

Father's Day shall be spent with Defendant every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.
Mother's Day shall be spent with Plaintiff every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

(g)

Defendant may have extended visitation during the children's summer vacation from school
for up to four weeks at Defendant's option. Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for
Defendant. The remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for Plaintiff consistent
with the above visitation schedule. Plaintiff shall have kn identical two week period of
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of
vacation. If the children are enrolled in year-round school, Defendant's extended visitation
shall be Vi of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided Plaintiff has holiday
and phone visits. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks shall be provided at
least 21 days in advance to the other parent.

(h)

Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours.

(i)

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation:
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children
at all such events and activities.

(j)

Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children.
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7.

On October 30, 1996 a Protective Order was issued in the case of Elaine Jenkins v

Samuel Jenkins. Civil No. 960907171SA (Utah 3d. Dist. Ct, Judge Thprne). The Protective Order
is consolidated in this Decree of Divorce. Defendant's compliance with the Protective Order shall
be reviewed at the same time as the review of temporary visitation.

If there have been no

substantive violations of the Protective Order, Plaintiff and Defendant shall jointly move the proper
court to set it aside. The following is entered as a protective order in this action-:
Neither party shall commit or threaten to commit any act of physical violence,
injury, intimidation or harassment against the other party, or against any of the
children, or against the other party's real or personal property. Neither party shall
enter the real property of the other party, except for the purpose of implementing the
child custody and visitatiop provisions of this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce,
or by prior invitation by the other party.
8.

Child support is awarded as follows:

(a)

Child support is awarded pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, using actual
or imputed incomes of $1,250.00 per month for Plaintiff and $850.00 per month for
Defendant, for a base child support award in the amount of $337.16 per month.

(b)

The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during
which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement
of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for reduction of
child support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative agency.
Normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an
interruption of the consecutive day requirement.

(c)

Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding pursuant to U.C. A. 62A-11 Parts
4 and 5.
9.

If available, insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children shall be

provided by the parent to whom it is most readily available at a reasonable cost. Each parent shall
share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid for the children's portion of
insurance, calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of minor children covered. Each parent shall share
equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and
copayments, incurred for the minor children. The parent maintaining coverage shall provide
verification of coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the minor children, and
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thereafter on or before January 2 of each calender year. The parent shall also notify the other
parent of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 days of the date he or she
first knew or should have known of the change. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within
30 days of payments. A parent incurring medical expenses shall forfeit the right to receive credit
for and to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if he or she fails to comply with the
notice requirements of this paragraph.
10.

Each parent shall share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses of

the parents. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin paying his share on
a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense, but if the child
care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payments of that
expense while it is not being incurred. A parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written
verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall notify
the other parent of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within
30 calendar days of the date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses shall forfeit the
right to receive credit for and to recover to other parent's share of the expenses if he or she fails to
comply with the notice requirements of this paragraph.
11.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in

Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce Defendant shall execute and
deliver to Plaintiff a deed quitclaiming his interest in the real property in lieu of alimony.
12.

The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage.

13.

The parties have acquired certain items of personal property, which shall be divided

as follows: Defendant is awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools, one
set of the parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers.
Plaintiff is awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer. Defendant is awarded all other vehicles.
Plaintiff is awarded all other personal property.
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14.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible for their own student loans,

and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from liability therefore.
15.

Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff harmless from liability on all

other debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred by the parties prior to their
separation. Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole responsibility of the party who
incurred the particular debt or obligation.
16.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax returns for 1995 and 1996.

17.

Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for the parties' minor

children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is current in his child
support obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the personal exemptions
for the minor children on his income tax return.
18.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs.

19.

This Decree resolves all outstanding issues between Plaintiff and Defendant raised

directly or indirectly by the pleadings in this matter.
20.

Each party shall execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required to

implement this Decree of Divorce.
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ADDENDUM 13

F

T h i D w 0 , r S T R I C T COURT
I nird Judicial District

OCT 1 3 2006
SALT LAKE COI

By.

CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826)
Attorney for Defendants Alan Jenkins, Trustee and Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc.
3212 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone: 486-1458

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—

ELAINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.

Civil No. 050903391

ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, et al.,
Defendants.

Judge Fratto
-oooOooo-

Alan Jenkins, Trustee and Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. propose the
following jury instructions.
Dated this /&

day of October, 2006.

Carl E. Kingston
Attorney for Alan Jenkins, Trustee
and Davis County
Cooperative Society, Inc.

Jury Instruction No.
A person claiming an interest in real property, must be able to evidence that interest by a
deed or conveyance in writing, signed by the entity or person from whom that person claims to
have acquired the interest. If there is no such deed or conveyance in writing, under the law, that
person has no enforceable interest in the property.

U.C.A. 25-5-1
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Jury Instruction No.
There is an exception to the law that a person claiming an interest in real property must
be able to evidence that interest by a deed or conveyance in writing, signed by the entity or
person from whom that person claims to have acquired the interest. To qualify for the exception,
Elaine Jenkins must prove by clear and positive proof that there was an agreement between her
and the property owner that the property would be transferred to her if she performed certain
conditions, the agreed conditions must be established with certainty and you must find that she
did in fact perform those conditions pursuant to the agreement.

U.C A . 25-5-8
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 160 P. 2d 570 (1953)
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Jury Instruction No.
"Agreement" means the actual bargain between the parties. An agreement for the sale of
land is void and unenforceable unless the agreement or some note or memorandum of the
agreement is in writing, signed by the party selling the land.

U.C.A 25-5-3
Birdzell v. Utah Oil Ref Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952)

Jury Instruction No.
There is a four year statute of limitations that governs the recovery of real property held
by a person other than the owner of the property. This means that in order to recover property
held in trust by another entity, the true owner must file suit to recover the property within four
years from the time she discovers that the property was not in her name. Elaine Jenkins claims
that although Alan Jenkins holds legal title to the property, she and her ex-husband Sam paid for
the property and are the true owners of the property. If you find that Elaine Jenkins did pay for
the subject property, in order to prevail on this claim. Elaine Jenkins must show that she did not
learn that the property was in someone's name other than hers and Sam's until a date less than
four years from the date she filed the Complaint in this case. If you find that Elaine Jenkins
knew that the title to the property in question was held in someone's name other than hers or
Sam's more than four years before she filed the lawsuit in this case, you must find in favor of
Alan Jenkins.

U.C.A. 78-12-25
American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992),

Jury Instruction No.
The occupation of real property by someone other than the person who establishes legal
title to the property is deemed to be under and by the authority of the person establishing legal
title, unless the person occupying the property can show that she has occupied the property for at
least seven years and that during that seven year period, she has paid all of the taxes levied and
assessed against the property. Unless you find that Elaine Jenkins has paid all of the real
property taxes assessed against the property for seven consecutive years, and that such payment
was not paid to the property owner as partial rent or consideration for the right to use of the
property under a rental agreement, you must find in favor of Alan Jenkins.

U.C.A. 78-12-7
U.C.A. 78-12-12
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989)
Keller v. Chournos. 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943)
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943)

Jury Instruction No.
When a person, by her acts or conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe in the
existence of a certain state of things, and thereby induces him to act on that belief so as to
change his previous condition, the person inducing such belief will be estopped from afterwards
denying the existence of such state of things, to the prejudice of the person so acting.

Jury Instruction No.
In order to find that Elaine Jenkins performed or partially performed an agreement
whereby she would obtain title to the real property in question, even though there is no written
document evidencing such an agreement, you must find that the owner of the property agreed
that upon the performance of certain actions, the property would be transferred to her; that there
was a meeting of the minds between the owner of the property and Elaine Jenkins as to what
those certain actions were that she was to perform and that she did in fact perform those actions

Jury Instruction No.
A party cannot adopt a position in a subsequent lawsuit contrary to a position ruled upon
by the court in a previous lawsuit. If you find that in Elaine Jenkins' previous divorce action,
she took the position that she did not own the property in question and that the court ruled in a
final judgment that she did not own the property, then you must find against her on the claim
she now makes in this lawsuit that she does own the property.

Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 2000 Utah 93, 16 P.3d 1214,
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